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INTRODUCTION 
Every Sunday Catholics across the globe gather together in their parish 
churches to celebrate Mass. For many parishioners, this is a time for prayer, 
reflection, and community. For a teenage girl in Clinton, Louisiana, however, 
attending Mass became a living nightmare. Sitting in a pew nearby was the 
man who allegedly had been sexually harassing and abusing her for an entire 
summer.1 Sitting next to her were her unsuspecting parents, whom she feared 
to tell about the abuse.2 Standing on the altar was the priest to whom she 
had confessed the alleged series of abusive acts.3 The purported 
relationship between the girl and her abuser started innocently enough; she 
claimed that the man would send her emails regularly with inspirational 
religious verses. Harmless electronic communication reportedly escalated 
                                                                                                             
  Copyright 2017, by CAROLINE DONZE. 
 1. Parents of Minor Child v. Charlet, 135 So. 3d 1177, 1178 (La. 2014). 
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to grossly inappropriate physical contact, including kissing and groping, 
and the man expressing his desire to have sexual intercourse with her.4 
The girl communicated to her priest everything the man allegedly did to 
her. She may have expected that the leader of the tight-knit church community 
would help her achieve the goal she could not accomplish alone: confronting 
her parents and abuser and revealing the secrets she had bottled up for so long. 
But instead of receiving support and guidance from the priest, he reportedly told 
her to deal with the problem herself and refrain from exposing the crimes to 
avoid ruining the lives and reputations of her family and abuser.5 
The girl’s parents eventually realized their daughter’s secret, but by then 
the damage was done. The priest’s failure to report the information supposedly 
learned in the confessional reportedly allowed the abuse to continue and 
escalate when a simple phone call to mom, dad, or the police would have ended 
the nightmare quickly.6 Had the girl confessed to a school teacher or soccer 
coach, Louisiana law would have required immediate reporting of the suspected 
abuse to law enforcement.7 A teacher or coach would have had to report the 
abuse at once because Louisiana has designated teachers and coaches as 
mandatory reporters—professionals required by law to report allegations or 
suspicions of child abuse immediately to the authorities.8 This girl made her 
confession to a Catholic priest during a religious sacrament, however.9 Priests 
are also mandatory reporters of child abuse in Louisiana—subject to one major 
exception.10 Louisiana, like many other states in this country, exempts clergy 
from their ordinary mandate to report if they learn of ongoing or imminent 
abuse within the context of a confidential religious communication.11 This 
exception stems from the clergy-penitent privilege, which prohibits 
compelled disclosure of the contents of private communications between 
clergy and their communicants in a judicial proceeding.12 
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The intersection of mandatory reporting legislation and the clergy-
penitent privilege illustrates a conflict between the public policy goal of 
protecting children and the constitutional right to Free Exercise of religion.13 
Though the protection of religious freedom is a cornerstone of the 
Constitution, a state may still constitutionally impose burdens on Free 
Exercise if some compelling state interest exists to justify the infringement 
and if no less restrictive form of regulation is available to achieve the state’s 
interest.14 This Comment argues that abrogation of the clergy-penitent 
privilege within a state’s mandatory reporting legislation—in the specific 
instance where clergy receive confessional reports of ongoing or imminent 
child abuse—can withstand constitutional scrutiny. Abrogation of the 
privilege is constitutional because the identification and prevention of child 
abuse is a compelling state interest and eliminating the privilege in the narrow 
circumstance of confessional reports of abuse is the least restrictive means of 
carrying out this interest.  
Although the objective of protecting child abuse victims from harm 
justifies abrogation of the privilege, conflicts posed by the laws of the Catholic 
Church nevertheless may hinder the fulfillment of this compelling state 
interest. Catholic priests face expulsion from the Church as punishment for 
divulging information learned during sacramental confessions.15 Even in the 
presence of an unconditional legal mandate to disclose child abuse, priests still 
may refuse to report and testify about privileged communications to avoid 
their removal from the Church.16 
Part I of this Comment examines the history of the clergy-penitent 
privilege from its biblical origins to its modern treatment in American courts. 
Part II surveys the status of mandatory reporting law in Louisiana and the rest 
of the United States, focusing on statutory exceptions for clergy. Part III 
explores the constitutional basis for abrogating the clergy-penitent privilege 
within mandatory reporting law. Finally, Part IV considers a jurisprudential 
example of the negative effects of the privilege on the reporting of child abuse 
and contemplates potential avenues for encouraging Catholic priests to report 
abuse while still maintaining the integrity of the sacrament of Confession.  
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I. TRACING THE HISTORY OF THE CLERGY-PENITENT PRIVILEGE 
The clergy-penitent privilege originated from the Roman Catholic “seal of 
confession,” a centuries-old religious doctrine of confidentiality that protects the 
sacramental confessions between a priest and his penitent—the sinner seeking 
God’s forgiveness for his transgressions.17 Courts in the United States have 
acknowledged the importance of safeguarding religious communications. 
Likewise, each state legislature has codified some version of the seal of 
confession. 
A. A Privileged Society: The Benefits of Holding Certain Disclosures 
Sacrosanct 
Evidentiary privileges reflect the notion that communications within 
certain relationships deserve to be kept in confidence.18 Privileges usually 
occupy statutory law and typically are based upon public policy goals of 
individual states rather than constitutional rights.19 In the judicial system, 
privileges hinder the fact-finding process by allowing suppression of 
potentially relevant information and testimony; privileges nonetheless persist 
in statutory law, which reflects a societal view that the benefits of preserving 
confidential relationships sometimes outweigh hindrances to the pursuit of 
justice.20 The attorney-client privilege, for example, allows a client complete 
and unfettered access to legal counsel with the peace of mind that his lawyer 
will not reveal their conversations to third parties.21 Similarly, the spousal 
privilege allows a husband to refuse to testify against his wife because the 
trust and confidence crucial to preserving the marital relationship would be 
destroyed if a court could compel such testimony.22 Finally, a privilege of 
confidentiality between clergy and penitent is socially desirable because the 
promise of secrecy encourages individuals to seek regular spiritual guidance 
from their religious leaders.23  
Privileges often have limitations in extraordinary situations. A lawyer’s 
ethical duty to prevent reasonably certain death or bodily harm overrides his 
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ordinary duty of confidentiality to the client.24 Likewise, a mental health 
professional may be required to warn third parties if a patient expresses a 
desire to inflict violence upon another person.25 The clergy-penitent privilege 
contrasts from other evidentiary privileges because confidentiality may be 
mandated under religious doctrine, making the privilege absolute even under 
exceptional circumstances.26 The clergy-penitent privilege is also unique 
among privileges because the receiver of the communication, the clergy 
member, potentially may claim protection from compelled disclosure under 
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, a defense not available to 
a doctor or a lawyer.27 
Under evidentiary privileges, “the holder of [the privilege] has the power 
to invoke or waive it, either refusing or allowing courts to gain access to 
confidential communications.”28 “Ownership” of a privilege typically belongs 
to the communicant, not the receiver of the communication.29 For instance, 
the attorney-client privilege vests the client with the power to authorize the 
disclosure of private communications made within the scope of the legal 
relationship.30 Similarly, the doctor-patient privilege allows a patient to waive 
confidentiality, thus permitting medical professionals to testify about 
information related to that patient’s treatment.31 The clergy-penitent privilege 
is unique because a communicant’s waiver of privilege may not be sufficient 
for clergy, specifically those of the Catholic faith, to justify revealing the 
details of a private confession. A Catholic priest faces possible expulsion from 
both his clerical office and the Catholic Church entirely for revealing a private 
confession, even if the penitent waives confidentiality.32 The basis for this 
harsh punishment arose from the historical evolution of the sacrament of 
Confession.33 
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B. A Catholic Sacrament Forms the Basis for the Clergy-Penitent 
Privilege  
Confession, known formally as Reconciliation or Penance,34 has a 
longstanding tradition in Catholicism dating back to the New Testament 
and the life and ministry of Jesus Christ.35 During his public life, Jesus 
emphasized forgiveness of sin and the importance of welcoming repentant 
sinners back into the church community.36 The Bible recounts the origin 
of Confession as a sacramental practice, chronicling how Jesus bestowed the 
power of forgiveness upon his apostles, the first priests of the Catholic faith.37 
The apostles and the priests who succeeded them subsequently would serve 
as “God’s intermediar[ies]” in hearing and forgiving the sins of penitents.38 
During the early centuries of Catholicism, the process of receiving 
forgiveness for one’s sins was a public affair. Penitents guilty of serious sins 
such as adultery or idolatry were required to give their confessions and 
perform acts of repentance in front of large crowds.39 Public confession was 
a short-lived practice, however. In the seventh century, Catholic missionaries 
from Ireland introduced private, confidential confessions into the Catholic 
Church in continental Europe after being inspired by practices of Eastern 
monastic societies.40 The new approach to Confession was attractive to 
penitents because the guarantee of confidentiality encouraged sinners to 
                                                                                                             
 34. The sacrament of Reconciliation or Penance is defined in the Code of 
Canon Law: 
In the sacrament of penance, the faithful who confess their sins to a 
legitimate minister, are sorry for them, and intend to reform themselves 
obtain from God through the absolution imparted by the same minister 
forgiveness for the sins they have committed after baptism and, at the 
same, time are reconciled with the Church which they have wounded by 
sinning. 
1983 CODE c.959. 
 35. Mazza, supra note 26, at 174. 
 36. THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH, CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 
1443 (1992). 
 37. John 20:21–23. According to the Gospel of John, when Jesus appeared to 
his apostles following his Resurrection, he bequeathed them with the power to 
forgive the sins of penitents. Id. 
 38. Brooks, supra note 12, at 120. 
 39. See CATECHISM, supra note 36, at 1447; see also Adam Bowers, The Origins 
of Mandatory Private Confession in the Catholic Church, QUARTERMASTER OF THE 
BAROQUE (Oct. 30, 2013), https://qmbarque.com/2013/10/30/the-origins-of-manda 
tory-private-confession-in-the-catholic-church/ [https: //perma.cc/SP3F-DBWE]. 
 40. CATECHISM, supra note 36, at 1447. 




receive the sacrament frequently and without fear of negative public 
sentiment.41 
Confidential confessions gained widespread acceptance and canon law 
eventually incorporated the practice.42 In 1215, the Catholic Church codified 
the seal of confession into the Code of Canon Law, imposing a strict obligation 
of secrecy upon clergy and a severe penalty for violations of confidentiality, an 
obligation that still exists in the present day.43 Under canon law, a priest who 
directly violates the seal of confession faces excommunication from the 
Church.44 Excommunication is the gravest penalty a member of the Catholic 
faith can receive and results in expulsion from the Church and exclusion from 
all sacraments.45 
Prior to the Protestant Reformation—a movement that involved several 
groups breaking off from the Roman Catholic Church to form their own 
religious denominations—English law acknowledged the sacred nature of 
Confession and did not require priests to breach the sacrament’s requirement 
of confidentiality.46 Because many English judges also were members of the 
clergy, the law of the Catholic Church heavily influenced the common law.47 
In the 16th century, however, the Protestant Reformation reached England, 
and the Anglican Church replaced the Catholic Church as the official Church 
of England.48 The years that followed saw the deterioration of the confessional 
seal in England, as Anglicanism distinguished itself from Catholicism by 
placing less emphasis on the importance of visiting the confessional and 
making private confessions with a minister an optional practice.49 Despite the 
events of the Protestant Reformation, the modern Catholic Church continues 
                                                                                                             
 41. Id. 
 42. Canon law is “the body of laws and regulations made by or adopted 
ecclesiastical authority, for the government of the Christian organization and its 
members.” Auguste Boudinhon, Canon Law, 9 THE CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 56 
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 43. 1983 CODE c.983, § 1 (“The sacramental seal is inviolable; therefore, it 
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678 (1909); see also Brooks, supra note 12, at 120. 
 46. Jacob Yellin, The History and Current Status of the Clergy-Penitent Privilege, 
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 47. Id. at 97. 
 48. Mitchell, supra note 17, at 736. 
 49. Yellin, supra note 46, at 101–02. Members of the Catholic Church are 
required to confess their sins at least once a year. 1983 CODE c.989. 




to uphold confidential Confession in accordance with the sacrament’s 
historical basis.  
C. The Clergy-Penitent Privilege in Jurisprudence and Statutory Law 
State legislatures across the United States have incorporated the seal 
of confession into statutory law through adoption of the clergy-penitent 
privilege. National endorsement of the privilege reflects a public policy 
that values the sanctity of conversations between members of a particular 
faith and their religious advisors.50 Moreover, when religious doctrine 
explicitly requires clergy to abide by a duty of confidentiality, the privilege 
is not merely socially desirable—it also implicates the constitutional right 
to Free Exercise of religious belief.51 
1. People v. Philips: Validating the Seal of Confession in a Court of 
Law 
The first instance of an American court addressing the validity of the 
Catholic seal of confession occurred in People v. Philips, an 1813 criminal 
case from the Court of General Sessions of the City of New York.52 The 
defendant and his wife were indicted for possessing stolen goods.53 The 
owner of the goods reported that the stolen items had been returned to him 
by a Catholic priest, Father Anthony Kohlmann, who had received the 
goods from the thieves with the instructions that they be returned to their 
rightful owner.54 When summoned to testify at trial to confirm the thieves’ 
identities, Kohlmann refused to provide any information because he had 
learned their identities within the sacrament of Confession.55 The court 
then had to decide whether the priest could be compelled to divulge the 
secrets of a religious communication.56 
                                                                                                             
 50. Paul Winters, Whom Must the Clergy Protect? The Interests of At-Risk 
Children in Conflict with Clergy-Penitent Privilege, 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 187, 188 
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Kohlmann presented a compelling argument for protecting the seal of 
confession in his request that the court excuse him from testifying, 
invoking his deeply held religious convictions:  
. . . if called upon to testify in quality of a minister of a sacrament, 
in which my God himself has enjoined on me a perpetual and 
inviolable secrecy, I must declare to this honorable Court, that I 
cannot, I must not answer any question that has a bearing upon the 
restitution in question; and that it would be my duty to prefer 
instantaneous death or any temporal misfortune, rather than 
disclose the name of the penitent in question. For, were I to act 
otherwise, I should become a traitor to my church, to my sacred 
ministry and to my God. . . . I should render myself guilty of eternal 
damnation.57 
The court ultimately found Kohlmann’s testimony inadmissible, basing its 
reasoning upon the priest’s right to freely exercise his religion under the New 
York Constitution.58 The court declared that the right to Free Exercise mandates 
that particular rules of religious ceremonies be protected; furthermore, it noted 
that secrecy is essential to the sacrament of Confession because penitents would 
have no incentive to pronounce their sins to a priest if the veil of confidentiality 
were removed.59  
Philips was the first example of an American court endorsing an 
evidentiary privilege exclusively for clergy. Extending a privilege to Catholic 
priests made logical sense from a Free Exercise standpoint because failure to 
respect the seal of confession would destroy a fundamental component of 
Catholicism: private confession of one’s sins to a priest without fear of third-
party knowledge.60 Whether the privilege would have the same application to 
non-Catholic clergy remained unclear in the immediate aftermath of Philips. 
Four years after the decision, however, a different New York state court held 
in People v. Smith that the privilege did not apply to a Protestant minister 
regarding private confessions made to him by the defendant in that case.61 
In distinguishing Philips, the Smith court noted the fundamental 
differences between Catholicism and Protestantism. The principal disparity 
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 58. Privileged Communications, supra note 52, at 207. New York's constitution 
provided that “the Free Exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, 
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 59. Privileged Communications, supra note 52, at 207. 
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was a matter of church doctrine. The trial judge in Smith drew a distinction 
“between auricular confessions made to a priest in the course of discipline, 
according to the canons of the church, and those made to a [Protestant] minister 
. . . in confidence, merely as a friend or adviser.”62 Because Protestantism had 
neither an analogue to the sacrament of Confession nor a seal of confidentiality 
codified under church law, the court allowed the minister to testify.63 
Additionally, the right to Free Exercise—a crucial factor in Philips—was not at 
issue in Smith because the Protestant minister actually desired to testify and 
faced no consequences for breaking the confidence of a private confession.64 
Conversely, Philips involved a priest who staunchly refused to testify to avoid 
violating his religious duty under the confessional seal.65 
2. Codification of the Clergy-Penitent Privilege 
In 1828, the New York Legislature enacted a statutory version of the 
clergy-penitent privilege—the first law of its kind in the United States.66 The 
statute stated that “[n]o minister of the gospel, or priest of any denomination 
whatsoever, shall be allowed to disclose any confessions made to him in his 
professional character, in the course of discipline enjoined by the rules or 
practice of such denomination.”67 On its face, the law appeared to eliminate 
lines drawn in prior jurisprudence by applying generally to all denominations 
rather than singling out Catholicism; the privilege’s scope, however, was still 
confined to confessions protected under church disciplines.68 In practice, the 
law protected only Catholic confessions from disclosure69 and thus merely 
codified the Philips decision.70 
The rest of the nation eventually followed New York’s lead, and today all 
50 states provide evidentiary privileges protecting certain communications 
made to clergy.71 Some states apply the privilege only to communications 
                                                                                                             
 62. Privileged Communications, supra note 52, at 211 (emphasis added). 
 63. See id. at 207. 
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Reese, Confidential Communications to the Clergy, 24 OHIO ST. L.J. 55, 57 (1963). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Brooks, supra note 12, at 122. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Norman Abrams, Addressing the Tension Between the Clergy-Communicant 
Privilege and the Duty to Report Child Abuse in State Statutes, 44 B.C. L. REV. 1127, 
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deemed confidential under the tenets of a particular religion.72 Other states 
broaden the privilege to all private conversations with religious leaders, 
regardless of church doctrine.73 Though each state law varies in phrasing, no 
modern-day statute explicitly limits the privilege to Catholicism.74 A 
generally applicable privilege presents a range of interpretation issues. The 
clergy-penitent privilege originated to protect a specific and easily 
recognizable form of communication: oral confessions of sin to a priest 
within the Catholic sacrament of Confession.75 Extending the privilege 
beyond the scope of its original design forces lawmakers and judges to 
consider the different types of communications made to clergy of various 
religions and determine which ones fall under the umbrella of protected 
communications.76 
In 1972, the United States Supreme Court approved an amendment to 
the Federal Rules of Evidence that would have codified the clergy-penitent 
privilege. Proposed Rule 506 stated “[a] person has a privilege to refuse to 
disclose and to prevent another from disclosing a confidential communication 
by the person to a clergyman in his professional character as spiritual 
adviser.”77 Congress never enacted the rule, opting for the more general 
and adaptable Rule 501,78 which allows rules of privilege to be shaped by 
federal common law and evolve on a case-by-case basis.79 Though never 
implemented, Proposed Rule 506 is still a guiding force in statutory 
construction of the clergy-penitent privilege at the state level.80  
                                                                                                             
 72. Brooks, supra note 12, at 123. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Mitchell, supra note 17, at 747; see generally CHILDREN’S BUREAU, 
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 75. Mitchell, supra note 17, at 747. 
 76. Id. 
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law supplies the rule of decision. 
FED. R. EVID. 501 (2017). 
 79. Mitchell, supra note 17, at 740. 
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3. The Supreme Court Validates the Clergy-Penitent Privilege, if 
Only in Dicta 
The United States Supreme Court has addressed the clergy-penitent 
privilege a handful of times, though only indirectly. In Totten v. United 
States, an 1875 case concerning national secrets, the Court noted in dicta 
that “suits cannot be maintained which would require a disclosure of the 
confidences of the confessional.”81 Almost a century later in United States 
v. Nixon, the Supreme Court again addressed the privilege, stating that 
although discussions between President Richard Nixon and his staff were 
not subject to a privilege of confidentiality, a priest, alternatively, could 
not be compelled by a court to disclose information revealed to him in a 
confessional context.82  
Finally, in Trammel v. United States, the Court discussed the rationale 
behind maintaining the sanctity of religious conversations, stating that the 
clergy-penitent privilege “recognizes the human need to disclose to a 
spiritual counselor, in total and absolute confidence, what are believed to be 
flawed acts or thoughts and to receive priestly consolation and guidance in 
return.”83 The Court further noted that the privilege is based on the urgent 
need for confidence and trust—two qualities that would disintegrate if 
penitents knew clergy had the freedom to divulge private confessions to 
third parties.84 Though mentioned in dicta in these three cases, the Supreme 
Court has yet to rule directly on whether the United States Constitution 
protects the clergy-penitent privilege.85 
II. CHURCH AND STATE COLLIDE: MANDATORY REPORTING 
LEGISLATION AND THE CLERGY 
Although the clergy-penitent privilege has national endorsement, it is 
sometimes subject to narrow interpretation in situations of suspected child 
abuse.86 Following the nationwide adoption of mandatory reporting 
statutes, many states named clergy as mandatory reporters. The dilemma 
of whether to incorporate the clergy-penitent privilege into mandatory 
reporting laws, however, sparked considerable debate. 
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A. The States Take an Active Role in Policing Child Abuse 
In 1974, Congress passed legislation making federal funds available 
to states for child abuse prevention and treatment.87 To be eligible for 
funding, states were required to enact legislation designating certain 
individuals as legally mandated reporters of child abuse and neglect.88 
Congress intended the conditional spending scheme to increase the 
probability that the sufferings of abuse victims—often never reported at 
all—would be disclosed to law enforcement.89 All 50 states eventually 
complied with Congress’s guidelines.90 Each state currently has its own 
comprehensive mandatory reporting scheme defining who is legally bound 
to report abuse (“mandatory reporters”), the conditions in which abuse 
must be reported, criminal penalties for failure to report, and whether 
certain evidentiary privileges affect the duty to report.91 
Mandatory reporters are generally adults whose employment grants 
them a strategic vantage point for identifying signs of child abuse and for 
undertaking the necessary steps to protect children.92 Mandatory reporting 
laws typically list professionals, such as teachers, therapists, and doctors, 
who are compelled to report serious allegations of child abuse discovered 
within the scope of their employment.93 Many states name clergy as 
mandatory reporters but, unlike most other professions, clergy often 
receive certain exemptions to the general mandate to report based on the 
clergy-penitent privilege.94 
1. Clergy as Mandatory Reporters: The Balancing Act of Satisfying 
Public Policy and Religious Freedom 
In 2002, the “Spotlight” investigative team of reporters for the Boston 
Globe published an exposé on a decades-long sexual abuse scandal within 
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the Catholic Church in Boston.95 The investigation revealed that child 
abuse ran rampant in the metropolitan area as local bishops knowingly 
concealed sexually abusive priests by shuffling them to new locations when 
their actions began attracting negative attention from parishioners.96  
In the wake of the Spotlight investigation, the Massachusetts Legislature 
rushed to soothe the public outcry directed at the abusive priests and the 
complicit bishops whose silence allowed these horrific acts to persist.97 
Legislators agreed that to avoid another scandal, clergy must be brought into 
the fold of mandatory reporters, but the scope of the proposed legislation gave 
rise to sharp divisions and significant debate.98 A major point of contention 
was whether to incorporate the clergy-penitent privilege into the law or 
abrogate the privilege entirely in circumstances of abuse.99 Some lawmakers 
argued that a statutory exemption for information learned in the confessional 
must exist to protect religious rights of clergy.100 Others urged that abuse must 
be reported regardless of the context of disclosure and that clergy should be 
treated no differently than other mandatory reporters who possess an 
unconditional duty to report.101 Even more strongly opposed to the inclusion 
of the privilege were constituents who claimed that making exceptions for 
clergy protects criminals, thereby allowing abusive behavior to continue at 
the expense of victims.102 
Ultimately, strong lobbying efforts and threats of lawsuits from 
religious organizations resulted in the inclusion of the exemption in the 
Massachusetts mandatory reporting law.103 The Massachusetts example 
illustrates the tension between church and state that makes the drafting of 
mandatory reporting laws for clergy so difficult. The failure of such a 
                                                                                                             
 95. Michael Rezendes, Church Allowed Abuse by Priest for Years: Aware of 
Geoghan Record, Archdiocese Still Shuttled Him from Parish to Parish, BOS. GLOBE 
(Jan. 6, 2002), http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/special-reports/2002/01/06/church-
allowed-abuse-priest-for-years/cSHfGkTIrAT25qKGvBuDNM/story.html [https://per 
ma.cc/WKT2-EMZS]. 
 96. Id. 
 97. See Jenkins, supra note 89. 
 98. Michael Paulson, Sex Abuse Reporting Measure Hits Snag: House, Senate 
Divided over Clergy Exemptions, BOS. GLOBE (Mar. 7, 2002), http://archive.boston.com 
/globe/spotlight/abuse/stories/030702_reporting.htm [https://perma.cc/8KFN-C74Z]. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Emily Eakin, Secrets Confided to the Clergy Are Getting Harder to Keep, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/02/16/arts/secrets-
confided-to-the-clergy-are-getting-harder-to-keep.html [https://perma.cc/72YN-
NK5U]. 
 103. Jenkins, supra note 89. 




monumental abuse scandal to motivate a state legislature to disregard the 
clergy-penitent privilege demonstrates the weight lawmakers sometimes 
place on religious rights in crafting mandatory reporting legislation. 
Today, clergy are defined explicitly as mandatory reporters in 28 states 
and Guam.104 Of these states, the overwhelming majority do not require clergy 
to report allegations of child abuse if the information is learned within a 
religious communication.105 These legal protections, known as “confessional 
shields” or “carve-outs,” functioned as a compromise for divided state 
legislatures, allowing for the expansion of mandatory reporting law without 
infringing upon religious freedoms of clergy.106 
2. States Abrogating the Clergy-Penitent Privilege for Suspected Child 
Abuse 
Six states and one United States territory abrogated the clergy-penitent 
privilege in their mandatory reporting legislation.107 These states embrace 
two different approaches to abrogation. The first and most explicit form 
involves states that specifically list clergy as mandatory reporters and 
expressly deny the privilege within the mandatory reporting statute.108 
West Virginia, New Hampshire, and Guam followed this route.109 The 
other method of abrogation is more subtle but has the same effect: a 
number of states do not list individual categories of mandatory reporters 
but rather mandate that “any person” who has suspicions of child abuse 
must report this information.110 Of the states listing “any person” as a 
mandatory reporter, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, and Texas 
abrogate the privilege not by explicitly denying its existence, but by 
broadly denying the existence of all evidentiary privileges—with the 
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exception of the attorney-client privilege—in cases of suspected child 
abuse.111 
A Texas state court of appeals addressed the Texas Legislature’s 
abrogation of the clergy-penitent privilege in Bordman v. State.112 The 
defendant in Bordman appealed his convictions for aggravated sexual 
assault of his three children on the grounds that his confession of the 
assaults to his Methodist minister was inadmissible based on privilege.113 
The court held that Texas’s mandatory reporting statute indicated a clear 
legislative intent to disregard the privilege in a judicial proceeding 
concerning sexual abuse of a child.114 As a result, the court affirmed the 
defendant’s convictions.115 
Bordman is reminiscent of the early New York cases of Philips and 
Smith in illustrating the crucial differences between Catholicism and 
Protestantism in the application of the clergy-penitent privilege.116 The 
court in Bordman did not delve into the constitutionality of the Texas 
statute—likely because the Methodist minister had no objection to 
testifying about the confession.117 Unlike Catholicism, Methodism—a 
Protestant religion—lacks a formal practice of confidential confessions 
between minister and penitent and does not penalize clergy for revealing 
private confessions.118 If the clergy member in Bordman were a Catholic 
priest rather than a Methodist minister, however, then the priest may have 
been unwilling to testify at the risk of expulsion from the Church like in 
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Philips.119 A resistant priest also might have raised a Free Exercise 
challenge in response to Texas’s abrogation of the privilege. 
3. A Code in Conflict: Mandatory Reporting Law in Louisiana 
In Louisiana, the Children’s Code provides the guidelines for mandatory 
reporting of child abuse.120 The overarching policy goal of the legislation is to 
protect the health and well-being of children through the identification and 
prevention of physical abuse, neglect, and exploitation.121 The Children’s 
Code provides a list of professionals defined as mandatory reporters of 
suspected child abuse. This list includes professions such as health 
practitioners, police officers, teachers, and athletic coaches.122 Failure to fulfill 
one’s duties as a mandatory reporter can result in criminal prosecution.123 The 
maximum penalty for a knowing or willful failure to report is a $500 fine 
and a six-month prison sentence.124 
Clergy are mandatory reporters in Louisiana but are not mandated to report 
sexual abuse allegations if two factors are present. First, the clergy member 
must be authorized by his religion to hear confidential communications. A 
communication is “confidential” when it is “made privately and not intended 
for further disclosure except to other persons present in furtherance of the 
purpose of the communication.”125 Second, the clergy member must be bound 
under religious doctrine to keep such communications confidential.126 If these 
requirements are met, the clergy member is only legally required to encourage 
the person alleging the abuse to report the information to the proper 
authorities.127  
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The Children’s Code also states that, regardless of the privileged nature 
of the communication, any mandatory reporter with reason to believe a child’s 
physical or mental well-being is in danger as a result of abuse must report his 
suspicions to law enforcement.128 The Louisiana Supreme Court recently held 
that a clergy member meeting the requirements necessary to invoke the 
privilege is no longer considered a mandatory reporter under the law.129 
Consequently, clergy falling under the exemption have no legal duty to report 
child abuse.130 
The ability to waive privilege in a protected communication rests not in 
the clergy member but rather in the penitent.131 According to the Louisiana 
Code of Evidence, “[a] person has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to 
prevent another person from disclosing a confidential communication by the 
person to a clergyman in his professional character as spiritual adviser.”132 
Clergy may only claim the privilege on a person’s behalf or on behalf of a 
deceased person.133 Thus, the penitent alone may waive the privilege in 
Louisiana. 
III. A PRIVILEGE STEEPED IN FIRST AMENDMENT ISSUES 
The inclusion of clergy in mandatory reporting legislation presents a 
tension between the two Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: the 
Free Exercise Clause and Establishment Clause.134 Among states listing 
clergy as mandatory reporters, two broad categories of legislation exist: 
statutes abrogating the clergy-penitent privilege entirely in situations of 
child abuse and statutes providing “confessional shields” or “carve-outs” to 
protect certain communications between clergy and their communicants.135 
Each type of legislation poses potential challenges under the First 
Amendment. 
For the handful of states that opted for abrogation, an unconditional 
mandate to report child abuse arguably offends Free Exercise rights because 
clergy may have religiously motivated reasons for refusing to disclose 
private conversations with their communicants.136 Alternatively, states with 
confessional carve-outs may potentially violate the Establishment Clause by 
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defining which religions merit the protection of the privilege and which do 
not.137 Catholicism benefits most of all from confessional carve-outs 
because it is one of the few religions having both an established practice of 
private confessions and an absolute duty of confidentiality codified under 
church law.138 
A. Abrogation of the Clergy-Penitent Privilege: A Permissible 
Infringement on Free Exercise 
Under the First Amendment, “Congress shall make no law respecting 
an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”139 
The Free Exercise Clause, which applies to individual states as well as the 
federal government,140 refers to “the right to believe and profess whatever 
religious doctrine one desires.”141 When the government forbids certain 
activities that are performed solely for religious reasons, the Free Exercise 
Clause is violated.142 For example, the government cannot ban the production 
of statues designed exclusively for religious worship or prohibit the practice 
of bowing down in front of a golden calf.143 The government also cannot force 
individuals to engage in activities offensive to their religious beliefs unless 
some overriding state interest justifies the compulsion of a certain action.144 
When a state compels disclosure of a confidential communication over 
the resistance of a member of the clergy, the right to Free Exercise may be 
violated if the grounds for objection are rooted in religious belief.145 
Potential religious bases for objection are numerous: a particular religion 
may explicitly prohibit disclosure; the clergy member may not want to 
breach the trust of his clerical office; or the clergy member may fear that 
communicants will be deterred from seeking religious counseling in the 
future if confidentiality is not guaranteed.146 
Free Exercise is not an absolute right; clergy may not invoke this 
clause to avoid engaging in any form of conduct offensive to their religious 
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beliefs.147 To allow an individual to claim immunities from every state law 
that conflicts with his religious values and opinions effectually “permit[s] 
every citizen to become a law unto himself.”148 In certain situations, 
government interference with religious practice is necessary and 
constitutionally permissible, a reality addressed by the United States 
Supreme Court throughout its history.149 For a state to justify infringement 
upon Free Exercise, it must show that the burden is incidental to a neutral 
and generally applicable law or, in certain jurisdictions, that the burden 
serves a compelling state interest in the least restrictive way possible.150 
States abrogating the clergy-penitent privilege within mandatory reporting 
laws must demonstrate the constitutionality of their legislation under the 
standards set by the Supreme Court and potentially under the more 
restrictive standards enacted by individual state legislatures. 
1. Employment Division v. Smith: Illustrating the Limits of Free 
Exercise Claims 
The landmark Supreme Court decision of Employment Division v. 
Smith provides one standard that guides lower courts and state legislatures 
regarding Free Exercise issues.151 The Smith plaintiffs, two Oregon citizens 
belonging to the Native American Church, were fired from their jobs as drug 
rehabilitation counselors for consuming peyote, an illegal hallucinogenic 
                                                                                                             
 147. Id. at 806. 
 148. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166–67 (1878). 
 149. See, e.g., id. (holding that the First Amendment allows regulation of 
religious practices); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402–03 (1963) (noting that 
the Free Exercise Clause does not protect overt religious acts that threaten public 
safety). Freedom to believe is an absolute right and not subject to balancing with 
state interests. See, e.g., Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 492–93 (1961) (holding 
that a state may not for any reason require its public officials to profess belief in 
God). If, on the other hand, a law burdens religious conduct, the state can defend its 
law by showing that the law is necessary to some compelling state interest. See 
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406. The state may also claim the law is a valid, neutral law 
of general applicability. Emp’t Div., Dept. of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 
878 (1990). Mandatory reporting requirements fall into the “burdening conduct” 
category: statutes that abrogate the clergy-penitent privilege punish a clergy 
member for the “act” of refusing to report. Mitchell, supra note 17, at 806 n.442. 
 150. See Emp’t Div., 494 U.S. at 879; see also State Religious Freedom 
Restoration Acts, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATORS (Dec. 15, 2015), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/state-rfra-statutes.aspx  
[https://perma.cc/8LPA-NVX9]. 
 151. See generally Emp’t Div., 494 U.S. 872. 




drug, as part of a religious ceremony.152 Oregon law classified peyote as a 
controlled substance and defined the possession of peyote as a felony.153 The 
plaintiffs subsequently were denied unemployment benefits for being 
terminated as a result of job-related misconduct.154 Citing the First 
Amendment, the plaintiffs argued that denial of compensation based on their 
sacramental consumption of peyote infringed upon their right to Free 
Exercise.155 
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia argued that mere possession of 
religious beliefs that go against societal interests does not relieve an individual 
from his civic responsibilities.156 Justice Scalia analogized Oregon’s law 
criminalizing peyote to laws involving tax collection: a person who believes 
that financially supporting organized government violates his religious 
convictions cannot simply refuse to pay his taxes because the burden is 
incidental to a neutral and valid purpose of collecting revenue.157 The 
Court held that denial of the plaintiffs’ unemployment benefits was lawful 
because “if prohibiting the exercise of religion . . . is not the object . . . but 
merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid 
provision,” then the right to Free Exercise is not offended.158 Because the 
Oregon law’s unbiased and lawful purpose was to deter all Oregon citizens 
from drug use, the plaintiffs could not claim exemption from compliance 
based on their religion’s encouragement of peyote use in sacramental 
ceremonies.159  
Mandatory reporting legislation abrogating the clergy-penitent 
privilege easily survives a Free Exercise challenge under Smith. In fact, 
eliminating the privilege actually enhances the general applicability of 
mandatory reporting laws. Mandatory reporting legislation is not 
religiously motivated but rather is driven by a neutral incentive to compel 
disclosure of child abuse by the people most likely to discover this 
information in their individual professions.160 Clergy are not alone in their 
mandate to report. Louisiana, for example, lists ten additional categories 
of professions as mandatory reporters, spanning a broad cross-section of 
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society.161 Including clergy in the class of mandatory reporters suggests an 
impartial legislative decision to give them the same responsibility as 
secular professionals to aid the state in policing child abuse.162 Neutrality 
also exists in the legislation’s underlying policy goal. The mandate to 
report child abuse arises from the legislative objectives of safeguarding 
children and preventing future abuse.163 In Louisiana, the Children’s Code 
clearly states that the welfare of the child is the “paramount concern” in 
all legal proceedings concerning child abuse.164 
2. The States Push Back Against Smith: A Revival of the Sherbert 
Test  
Although the Smith test demonstrates that abrogation of the clergy-
penitent privilege in mandatory reporting statutes is a permissible 
infringement on Free Exercise rights, a more stringent analysis may be 
required under the laws of Louisiana and 21 other states.165 In the wake of 
Smith, Congress quickly reacted to the Supreme Court’s rather lenient test 
by passing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) in an effort 
to implement a more rigorous standard for states to satisfy in justifying 
burdens on Free Exercise.166 The RFRA reinstated the “compelling state 
interest” test set by the Supreme Court in Sherbert v. Verner—the 
predecessor to Smith in Free Exercise jurisprudence.167 In Sherbert, the 
Court held that a state cannot refuse to provide unemployment benefits to 
a woman whose religion required her to abstain from working on 
Saturdays.168 The Court stated that “laws which burden free exercise of 
religion must be justified by a compelling state interest which cannot be 
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achieved without infringing Free Exercise rights,” a standard commonly 
known as strict scrutiny.169 
Strict scrutiny had been the test for determining constitutionality of 
laws burdening Free Exercise until Smith overruled the Sherbert analysis.170 
Congress enacted the RFRA in response to public dissatisfaction with the 
Smith decision, and, for a brief period, strict scrutiny was revived for Free 
Exercise cases.171 Ultimately, the Supreme Court struck down the RFRA in 
City of Boerne v. Flores as an unconstitutional exercise of congressional 
power in terms of the law’s application to the individual states.172 Many states, 
including Louisiana, responded to City of Boerne by enacting their own 
religious freedom laws.173 Louisiana’s Preservation of Religious Freedom Act 
adopted statutory language virtually identical to the RFRA.174 Consequently, 
in states with RFRA-inspired legislation, the more demanding strict scrutiny 
test—rather than the less onerous Smith test—may be applicable for analyzing 
the constitutionality of abrogating the clergy-penitent privilege in mandatory 
reporting legislation. 
3. Applying the Compelling State Interest Test to an Unconditional 
Mandate for Clergy to Report Child Abuse 
Under strict scrutiny, a compelling state interest justifies upholding 
mandatory reporting laws that abrogate the clergy-penitent privilege. 
Additionally, eliminating the privilege for the specific purpose of protecting 
children in immediate danger of sexual abuse is the least restrictive means 
of furthering the governmental interest of identifying and preventing child 
abuse. 
a. Compelling State Interest 
In proving a compelling state interest, a state can emphasize the 
obvious importance of protecting children from harm. The motive behind 
mandatory reporting legislation is to reveal as many incidents of ongoing 
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or imminent abuse as possible so the state can promptly intervene—either 
to mitigate the situation or to stop the abuse from happening in the first 
place.175 The state also has a responsibility to safeguard its children under 
the doctrine of parens patriae (“parent of the country”), which requires 
states to act as “parents” to their most dependent citizens.176 The doctrine 
provides a strong basis for state intervention in protecting innocent victims 
of child sexual abuse. In addition to the primary goal of protecting 
children, states may also desire to rehabilitate or punish abusers.177 
To further bolster a compelling state interest, states can argue that 
doing away with the clergy-penitent privilege in mandatory reporting 
statutes is crucial to avoiding issues that arise when clergy try to deal with 
child abuse epidemics within their own ranks.178 States can point to the 
Catholic Church’s disastrous history of addressing issues of child abuse 
“in-house.”179 Church attempts at self-policing child abuse without the 
knowledge or aid of law enforcement often exacerbate and perpetuate 
abuse.180 The Spotlight exposé documented how church leadership within 
the Archdiocese of Boston discouraged families of victims from reporting the 
abuse to law enforcement, entered into confidential settlements with affected 
families, and moved abusive priests to new church parishes where patterns of 
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offending priests more than the needs of children who had been, or were 
at risk of being, abused.  
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abuse continued.181 In light of failed attempts by the Catholic Church to 
adequately monitor and prevent this issue of child abuse, a state can argue that 
it has a much stronger claim to the physical protection of its citizens. A state can 
support this argument by showing that its law enforcement robustly investigates 
cases of reported child abuse and uses effective and appropriate procedures in 
intervening to protect abused children.182 States that satisfactorily police child 
abuse can thus make a strong case that abrogation of the privilege increases the 
probability that authorities receive immediate notice of abuse for the purpose of 
swift and efficient intervention.183 
Finally, states can argue that exceptions made for clergy within 
mandatory reporting statutes create ambiguity in the law.184 Difficulty may 
arise in a clergy member’s determination of whether his suspicions of child 
abuse result solely from the privileged communication or from non-
privileged observations.185 For instance, a Catholic priest initially may learn 
allegations of abuse within the confessional before later observing signs of 
abuse outside the sacrament, such as bruises on a child’s arm.186 The priest 
may feel compelled to refrain from reporting because he would not have 
noticed subsequent signs of abuse in the non-privileged setting if not for the 
initial confidential communication.187 The priest may assume that once 
information regarding child abuse is learned in a privileged conversation his 
duty to report no longer exists.188 
b. Least Restrictive Means/Narrow Tailoring 
A clear compelling state interest is only half of the analysis. If a clergy 
member challenges a mandatory reporting requirement in a state with RFRA-
inspired legislation, the state also must show that an unconditional mandate to 
report is necessary to attain the goal of protecting children from abuse and that 
the law is tailored in the least restrictive way possible to achieve that goal.189 
In other words, a state must prove it cannot adequately carry out its mission 
to identify and prevent sexual abuse of children unless clergy are considered 
mandatory reporters within the context of confidential communications. If the 
                                                                                                             
 181. Rezendes, supra note 95. 
 182. Mitchell, supra note 17, at 811. 
 183. See id. 
 184. Brooks, supra note 12, at 139. 
 185. Id. 
 186. See id. at 139–40. 
 187. See id. at 140. 
 188. Id. 
 189. See LA. REV. STAT. § 13:5233 (2017). 




state can prove that it cannot promote its interest without infringing on Free 
Exercise, then a burden on religion is justified. 
In proving the need for abrogation of the privilege, states can reference 
the unique position of a clergy member “as confidant, spiritual adviser, and 
[in certain religions] bespeaker of God’s forgiveness.”190 State legislatures do 
not compile their lists of mandatory reporters arbitrarily; the professionals 
selected represent those persons most likely to gain knowledge of sexual 
abuse of children within their respective professions.191 In their daily life and 
ministry, clergy occupy a strategic position to observe family interactions, and 
distressed individuals frequently reach out to clergy for advice and guidance, 
often within a confidential setting.192 The intimate nature of the clerical office 
results in an increased likelihood that abusers, victims, and third parties with 
knowledge of ongoing or imminent abuse will divulge this information to 
clergy.193 A state can argue that clergy are an indispensable source in its 
mission to identify and prevent abuse of children.194 Because valuable 
information is frequently learned within private communications, states 
cannot adequately police child abuse without an unconditional mandate for 
clergy to report that extends to confidential settings. 
Furthermore, children’s innocence and inability to comprehend the 
gravity of their own abuse support the argument that abrogation of the 
privilege is a necessary means of carrying out the state’s compelling interest. 
Reporting exemptions for clergy have a negative effect on children who do 
not understand the implications of confidential communications and 
confessional privileges. Child victims may go to clergy for counsel in a 
confidential setting out of fear, embarrassment, or a lack of resolve to tell 
parents or law enforcement about their abuse.195 The existence of confessional 
shields aggravates the traumatizing process children undergo in reporting 
abuse. Legislation restricting the frequency of disclosure worsens an already-
dire scenario: only one-third of child abuse victims report their abuse in a 
timely manner, and the remaining victims either wait several years to tell 
or never disclose the abuse.196 Many children who reveal their experiences 
of abuse will only tell their childhood peers who lack the maturity and 
resources necessary to provide adequate assistance.197 Unlike these child 
confidantes, clergy have the means and experience to provide immediate 
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and effective aid to victims.198 As such, the least restrictive way of 
maximizing the reporting of child abuse for the children who do choose to 
disclose their abuse to members of clergy is to abrogate the clergy-penitent 
privilege in the context of confidential communications. 
States can tailor their legislation narrowly by abrogating the privilege 
only in the specific situation where clergy have reason to believe a child 
is being abused currently or is in imminent danger of being abused.199 In 
keeping with the compelling state interest of protecting children, 
abrogation of the privilege logically must apply when anyone alleges 
abuse to a clergy member, whether that person is the victim, the abuser, or 
some third party.200 
B. Establishment Clause Issues: Favoring the Catholic Church over All 
Other Religions 
Under the Establishment Clause, Congress is forbidden from 
instituting a national religion.201 Even though the text of the clause only 
references Congress, its terms apply to the states as well.202 Furthermore, 
the Supreme Court has interpreted the clause as forbidding both the 
favoring of and discrimination against particular religions.203 Many states 
have mandatory reporting legislation that grants the clergy-penitent 
privilege only to religions imposing a duty of secrecy on their clergy under 
church doctrine.204 Even though these exceptions relieve the Free Exercise 
problem by accommodating religions with established disciplines of 
confidentiality, states that limit applicability of the privilege violate the 
Establishment Clause by benefitting a handful of religions over all 
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others.205 Narrowing the privilege’s scope to religions with specific 
disciplines of confidentiality also forces courts to entangle themselves in 
interpretation of religious doctrine, a scenario over which the Supreme 
Court has expressed great concern.206 
1. Town of Greece v. Galloway: An Unbiased Treatment of Religion 
In Town of Greece v. Galloway, the Supreme Court provided guidance in 
analyzing conflicts between confessional carve-outs and the Establishment 
Clause. In 1999, the town supervisor of Greece, New York instituted the 
practice of opening monthly town board meetings with a prayer led by a 
clergy member from the community.207 To select the prayer-givers, a town 
employee would contact the heads of local religious congregations from the 
telephone directory.208 At no point did the town exclude or deny particular 
religions the opportunity to participate in leading prayer.209 Nevertheless, 
from 1999 to 2007, all of the prayer leaders were members of Christian 
faiths.210 Two regular attendees of the board meetings brought suit against 
the town, alleging that it had violated the Establishment Clause by 
favoring Christian prayer leaders over clergy members from other 
religious denominations.211 
Because the selection process was non-discriminatory and the town 
made reasonable attempts to find non-Christian volunteers, the Court held 
that the town did not violate the Establishment Clause.212 The Court further 
noted that the fact that the overwhelming majority of prayer-givers 
happened to be Christian was simply a natural effect of the demographics 
of Greece, a town where nearly all the religious congregations were of 
Christian denominations.213 Because the existing policies did not 
intentionally favor one religion over another, the Court held that Greece 
was not required “to search beyond its borders for non-Christian prayer 
givers in an effort to achieve religious balancing.”214 
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Finally, the Court declared that requiring Greece to implement diversity 
requirements for prayer-givers would foster excessive government 
entanglement with religion by forcing local leaders to make judgment calls 
about the proper number of religions the town should sponsor and the 
appropriate frequency with which each denomination should be represented 
at the meetings.215 The Court concluded that the existing non-discriminatory 
approach was sufficiently impartial toward individual religions and also 
avoided the troubling prospect of the government defining which religions 
were worthy of representation.216 
2. Applying Galloway to Mandatory Reporting Law 
Numerous states, including Louisiana, provide exemptions in their 
mandatory reporting legislation for clergy engaged in communications 
deemed confidential under the doctrines of their particular religion.217 By 
covering only religions that mandate private confession to clergy, the 
scope of the privilege is confined to the Roman Catholic Church and the 
doctrinally similar Eastern Orthodox and Lutheran Churches.218 Under 
Galloway, Louisiana and states with similarly worded legislation engage 
in discriminatory treatment of the non-Catholic religions that lack formal 
practices of confidential confession and duties of confidentiality. Unlike 
the unbiased prayer leader selection process in Galloway, limitation of the 
privilege to religions with established disciplines of confidentiality likely 
violates the Establishment Clause by giving preferential treatment to a 
particular type of clergy member to the exclusion of all others.219 
Limiting the scope of the privilege additionally forces courts to parse 
through religious doctrines in determining which circumstances divest a 
clergy member of mandatory reporter status.220 The Supreme Court 
expressed wariness toward governmental entanglement in religion in 
Galloway in regards to a government body deciding which religions 
deserve representation in opening prayers before town meetings.221 In a 
similar way, the drafting of confessional carve-out statutes in Louisiana 
and numerous other states forces the judiciary to determine which 
religions deserve exemption from the mandate to report.222 Judges are 
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required to take on the role of religious scholars and “engage in 
comparative theology” by analyzing the doctrines of various religions, and 
factfinders ultimately have to distinguish between denominations entitled 
to the privilege and ones undeserving of the exception.223 Such an inquiry 
is precisely the scenario feared by the Court in Galloway. 
3. Resolving Establishment Clause Issues 
One option for solving the Establishment Clause issue involves rewording 
mandatory reporting statutes to prohibit compelled disclosure from clergy 
engaged in any form of confidential communication regardless of whether it is 
protected under church doctrine. State legislatures could use Proposed Rule 
506 to the Federal Rules of Evidence as a rubric for redrafting. The proposed 
law would extend the clergy-penitent privilege to scenarios in which clergy 
engage in confidential communications with penitents while acting in their 
“professional character as spiritual adviser[s].”224 Use of a broad standard 
eliminates Establishment Clause problems by applying the privilege 
impartially to all clergy operating under the scope of their clerical positions.225 
This option is far from desirable from a public policy standpoint, however, 
because it hinders the state in identifying and preventing child abuse by 
significantly expanding the field of clergy who may claim exemptions from 
mandatory reporter status.226 
A more effective option requires abrogation of the privilege so all clergy 
must report abuse regardless of the tenets of their faith. Under Galloway, 
abrogation of the privilege for all clergy is non-discriminatory because no 
religion receives preferential treatment.227 Furthermore, the government 
can avoid excessive entanglement with religion because religious doctrine 
would be irrelevant under the law, thus obviating the need to judicially 
interpret church practices. 
IV. MAYEUX V. CHARLET: ILLUMINATING THE DEFICIENCIES 
OF CONFESSIONAL CARVE-OUTS 
A confused and distraught Rebecca Mayeux entered the confessional 
of her Catholic church in the summer of 2008 seeking to disclose not her 
own sins but those of her abuser. The priest whom she trusted more than 
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anyone to end her abuse allegedly met her cry for help with a cold and 
unaccommodating response. Now this priest is the central defendant in 
Mayeux’s civil lawsuit that seeks damages for his failure to take any action 
to report the abuse.228 Mayeux’s case provides a concrete example of how 
the presence of the clergy-penitent privilege in mandatory reporting law 
hinders the state in its mission to police child abuse.  
A. A Dark Secret Revealed in the Confessional 
Rebecca Mayeux and George Charlet were members of Our Lady of 
the Assumption Parish in the town of Clinton, Louisiana.229 Following a 
relocation in 2000 to Clinton from their previous home in Baton Rouge, 
the Mayeux family befriended Mr. Charlet and his wife after getting to 
know the couple through their church community.230 As she grew from 
childhood into adolescence, “Rebecca viewed Mr. Charlet as a second 
grandfather.”231 In the summer of 2008, 14-year-old Mayeux agreed to 
look after the Charlets’ grandchildren periodically.232 Mayeux exchanged 
email addresses with the Charlets so they could contact her when they 
needed a babysitter.233 At the beginning of the summer, 64-year-old Mr. 
Charlet began an email correspondence with Mayeux consisting of one to two 
emails per day, which included words of inspiration and daily Bible verses.234 
According to Mayeux’s petition for damages, the correspondence became 
inappropriate when Charlet started sending emails of a more personal nature 
that were “laced with seductive nuances” and when the frequency of emails 
gradually increased to five to seven emails per day.235 In July 2008, Charlet 
took a trip to South Korea where he kept a handwritten diary addressed 
specifically to Mayeux that documented his “passionate desire for her to 
be in South Korea with him, again laced with both seductive and sexual 
nuances.”236 According to Mayeux, the contact took on a physical nature 
when Charlet returned from his travels. Charlet invited her to visit his 
private office at the funeral home he managed under the pretense of having 
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her pick up materials for a local scouting troop he wanted her to join.237 
When the two were alone together in the office, Charlet reportedly kissed 
Mayeux, fondled her breasts, and told her “he wanted to make love to 
her.”238  
Fearful of telling her parents about the escalating sexual abuse, 
Mayeux sought support and advice from her parish priest Father Jeff 
Bayhi.239 Mayeux visited Bayhi three separate times during the summer to 
receive the sacrament of Confession.240 Mayeux stated in her petition that 
she revealed the details of Charlet’s abuse during her confessions.241 In 
response, Bayhi allegedly advised her “to move past the abuse, suggesting 
she ‘sweep it under the floor and get rid of it’” because the ramifications 
of divulging her secrets would end up hurting too many people.242 Bayhi 
reportedly made no efforts to stop the abuse, and the crimes Mayeux 
described to him went unreported.243 According to Mayeux, the abuse 
continued following the confessions, including one occasion in which 
Charlet surreptitiously fondled her under the dining table while they were 
eating lunch with his son, grandson, and Mrs. Charlet.244 A final incident 
occurred when Rebecca visited Charlet’s office intending to confront him 
about the abuse. Instead, the man reportedly overpowered her, forced her 
onto a sofa, and aggressively kissed and groped her until a knock at the 
front door of the funeral home interrupted his actions.245 
Despite Bayhi’s alleged failure to report, the intimate relationship 
between Charlet and Mayeux did not go wholly unnoticed. Several 
parishioners observed Charlet’s inappropriate public displays of affection 
toward Mayeux.246 Mayeux’s parents soon became aware of the obsessive 
amount of telephone calls and emails Charlet had been sending their 
daughter.247 Both parents confronted Rebecca and she confessed to them 
the horrid details of her abuse.248 The Mayeuxs immediately contacted 
Charlet, ordering him to cease all contact with Rebecca and proceeded to 
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file a formal complaint against him with the sheriff’s department.249 
During the initial investigation, however, Charlet died suddenly from a 
massive heart attack following knee-replacement surgery.250 
B. Procedural History: The Long and Winding Road to Trial 
Despite the sudden death of Rebecca’s alleged abuser, parents Robert 
and Lisa Mayeux brought a civil suit in July 2009 for damages caused by 
the sexual and inappropriate acts inflicted on Rebecca.251 The petition 
named as defendants the deceased Charlet, Father Bayhi, and the Roman 
Catholic Church of the Diocese of Baton Rouge (“the Diocese”).252 The 
Mayeuxs claimed that Charlet was liable as the alleged abuser, that Father 
Bayhi was liable for failing to report abuse allegations under mandatory 
reporting law, and that the Diocese was liable through vicarious liability 
stemming from Bayhi’s reported failure to take action following Mayeux’s 
revelations of abuse and for negligent hiring and training of the priest.253 
The petition specifically alleged that Bayhi negligently advised Mayeux 
during the confessions by telling her to handle the abusive situation 
personally and that the priest negligently failed to report the abuse 
immediately to law enforcement and to Mayeux’s parents.254  
Before the trial was scheduled to begin, the Diocese filed a motion in 
limine seeking to prohibit the plaintiffs from “mentioning, referencing, 
and/or introducing evidence at trial of any confessions that may or may 
not have taken place” between Bayhi and Mayeux while Bayhi was 
performing his official role as a priest in hearing a confession from his 
parishioner.255 The trial court denied the motion, finding that Mayeux’s 
testimony regarding the confession was relevant and that, as holder of the 
privilege, she was entitled to waive confidentiality and to testify about her 
own communications.256 The trial court noted, however, the challenge 
faced by Bayhi in which the priest’s religious duty under the sacramental 
seal would prevent him from contesting Mayeux’s testimony.257 Moreover, 
                                                                                                             
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. 
 251. Id. at 1178. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id.; see also LA. CODE EVID. art. 511 (2017). 
 254. Petition for Damages, supra note 230, at 8. 
 255. Charlet, 135 So. 3d at 1178. 
 256. LA. CODE EVID. art. 511; Charlet, 135 So. 3d at 1179. 
 257. Charlet, 135 So. 3d at 1179. 




according to Bayhi, the seal of confession mandates that a priest cannot 
reveal if a confession even took place.258 
The issue of Mayeux’s ability to testify reached the Louisiana Supreme 
Court, which agreed with the trial court that Mayeux may speak on the 
witness stand about the confessions.259 The Court declared that the privilege 
belongs to the penitent, not the priest.260 It further stated that because the 
holder of the privilege waived confidentiality, Bayhi could not then raise 
that same privilege to protect himself.261 
The Louisiana Supreme Court remanded the case to the district court to 
establish whether the communications between Mayeux and Bayhi were 
“confessions per se”—confessions heard within the context of the 
sacrament of Confession—and if there were any conversations outside of 
the confessional that would have mandated Bayhi to report allegations of 
abuse as a mandatory reporter.262 The Diocese then filed a petition for a writ 
of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, arguing that a factfinder 
should not be allowed to determine whether certain conversations are 
confessions per se.263 The Diocese argued that this discretion “allows the 
state to override the Catholic religion’s own determination of what its beliefs 
and practices require and destroys the sacred seal of confession in the 
process.”264 The Diocese stated that this issue “cuts to the core of the 
Catholic faith, and for a civil court to inquire as to whether a factual situation 
establishes the sacrament of confession is a clear and unfettered violation of 
the Establishment Clause of the Constitution of the United States.”265 In 
January 2015, the Supreme Court denied the writ, leaving the case back in 
state district court.266 
On remand, Judge Mike Caldwell conducted a pre-trial evidentiary 
hearing in which Bayhi testified that revealing a sacramental confession 
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would result in his excommunication from the Catholic Church.267 
Caldwell subsequently ruled that Children’s Code article 609(A)(1), 
which states that a mandatory reporter must report suspected child abuse 
regardless of privilege, violated Bayhi’s constitutional right to Free 
Exercise under the Louisiana Constitution.268 Citing Louisiana’s 
Preservation of Religious Freedom Act,269 Caldwell declared that 
Louisiana unquestionably has a compelling interest in protecting children 
from abuse but that the article he struck down was not the least restrictive 
way to accomplish this goal.270 Caldwell reiterated the Louisiana Supreme 
Court’s order that a jury must determine whether a confession per se actually 
took place and whether the priest’s duty to report had been triggered.271 He 
also declared that if a jury found that Bayhi obtained knowledge of 
Mayeux’s abuse within a confession per se, Mayeux’s attorneys may not 
argue that the priest had a legal duty to report the allegations.272 
In light of the constitutional issue at stake, Caldwell’s ruling to strike 
down article 609(A)(1) was appealed directly to the Louisiana Supreme 
Court.273 The Court ruled that Caldwell’s declaration of unconstitutionality 
was premature because the scope of Bayhi’s duty to report depended upon 
the jury’s factual determination of whether the priest learned the abuse 
allegations exclusively within a sacramental confession or whether he 
gained knowledge of the abuse outside the confessional.274 The Court 
decided that constitutional analysis of the law was unnecessary until the 
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jury made such a finding.275 Finally, the Court conclusively stated that a 
priest is not considered a mandatory reporter while administering a 
sacramental confession because the tenets of the Catholic Church dictate 
that priests are bound by religious duty to keep these communications 
confidential.276 
C. Charlet Brings out the Dark Side of the Confessional Privilege 
Under Louisiana’s Preservation of Religious Freedom Act, the state 
must burden Free Exercise in the least restrictive way necessary to carry 
out its compelling interest.277 The sequence of events in Charlet exhibits 
how confessional shields can result in the failure to adequately pursue 
identification and prevention of child abuse. Bayhi’s reported concealment 
of abuse and alleged insistence that Mayeux deal with the problem herself 
and “sweep [the abuse] under the floor” had the opposite result of the 
legislation’s intended goal.278 Because Bayhi allegedly refrained from 
reporting, law enforcement and Mayeux’s parents remained unaware of 
the abuse long enough for Charlet’s actions against Mayeux to persist and 
escalate.279  
Bayhi’s alleged actions—or more appropriately, inactions—are 
reminiscent of the misguided leadership of the Archdiocese of Boston in 
the Spotlight scandal—in which local Church authorities concealed the 
serial sexual abuse of several priests, allowing the priests to continue 
harming children in various church parishes for decades.280 Mayeux’s 
petition in the Charlet lawsuit states that her abuse continued and 
worsened following Bayhi’s failure to report.281 In fact, the most horrific 
instance of abuse alleged in Mayeux’s petition—when Mayeux confronted 
Charlet in his private office only to be forced onto a sofa and aggressively 
kissed and groped—occurred after Mayeux’s reported confessions to 
Bayhi.282  
Furthermore, Mayeux testified in her deposition that she did not 
comprehend the nature of the sacrament of Confession and did not desire 
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for Bayhi to keep the communication a secret.283 Charlet demonstrates 
how children cannot be expected to understand the intricacies of state law 
and canon law and may have no idea that a priest has both a clerical duty 
to refrain from reporting and a legal avenue to support his refusal to 
report.284 
Charlet also has entangled Louisiana courts in the interpretation of 
religious doctrine by delegating to the jury the role of determining whether 
confessions per se occurred between Bayhi and Mayeux.285 If the law 
required clergy to report abuse regardless of church doctrine, there would 
be no need for courts to concern themselves with the particulars of canon 
law; rather, the only inquiry would be whether a clergy member had 
knowledge of ongoing or imminent child abuse and, if so, whether he 
willfully refrained from reporting the information to the authorities.286 If 
the privilege were abrogated, the classification of the confession in Charlet 
under the doctrines of Catholicism would be irrelevant. Finally, abrogation 
of the privilege could still fulfill the Preservation of Religious Freedom 
Act’s narrow tailoring requirement because the Children’s Code only 
compels reporting if the mandatory reporter has reason to believe the 
child’s well-being is in immediate danger.287 
D. The Dilemma of Forcing a Catholic Priest to Reveal a Private 
Confession  
The Catholic Church’s principal argument for maintaining the clergy-
penitent privilege goes to the very existence of Confession: the sacrament 
would be rendered useless if the element of secrecy were jeopardized.288 
In Philips, the court summed up these fears by observing that if not for the 
“strict and perpetual silence” of the sacrament, Confession would be 
“wholly neglected and abandoned.”289 The court further noted that no 
sinner would possess the willingness to divulge his deepest and most 
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shameful secrets to a clergy member at full liberty to disclose this 
information.290 
Now that the Louisiana Supreme Court has declared Mayeux free to 
testify about her own confession, Bayhi faces a dilemma. Though Mayeux’s 
attorney clarified that he does not plan on calling Bayhi as a witness at trial, 
the situation presents a complicated scenario of divided loyalties.291 If Bayhi 
were called to testify, the first problem he would face is the choice between 
his civic duty to speak truthfully and comprehensively on the witness stand 
and his religious duty to remain silent. If Bayhi refuses to break the seal of 
confession, he could be held in contempt of court for failure to cooperate as 
a witness.292 
Bayhi additionally faces a choice between preservation of self and 
preservation of the seal of confession. If Bayhi refuses to testify on his own 
behalf, the jury will be left with only Mayeux’s version of events.293 If her 
testimony is convincing, the jury may render a costly verdict against Bayhi 
and the Diocese. Absent the religious barrier to testifying, Bayhi likely 
would benefit from taking the witness stand to give his side of the story 
and contest Mayeux’s accusations before the jury. When the case goes to 
trial and Mayeux takes the witness stand, Bayhi will be situated in “the 
legally untenable position of having to accept her version of events or 
break the seal and face automatic excommunication.”294 Bayhi’s mandate 
to remain silent ties his hands and leaves him at the jury’s mercy without 
a viable means to defend himself.295 
Despite the inequitable situation, the Diocese stated that in the event 
Bayhi were compelled to testify, he would accept court-imposed 
punishment rather than violate the seal of confession.296 If the hardline 
stance of Bayhi and the Diocese are any indication, abrogation of the 
clergy-penitent privilege—though constitutionally sound—will do little to 
further the compelling state interest of protecting children. As long as 
Catholic doctrine deems the confessional seal absolute, no drafting of the 
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law will compel priests—at least the priests that comply strictly with canon 
law—to break confidence and report information learned during Confession, 
even at the risk of civil liability or criminal punishment.297 
E. Carrying out Compelling State Interests While Maintaining 
Sacramental Integrity 
Charlet is just another flashpoint in the Catholic Church’s history of 
failure to address adequately the epidemic of sexual abuse of children. The 
interpretation of the confessional seal as an ironclad doctrine of 
confidentiality acts as a seemingly insurmountable obstacle to the 
reporting of abuse allegations heard within the confessional. A closer look 
at the text of canon law and increased efforts within the Catholic Church 
to train priests in dealing with abuse, however, may allow for the 
furthering of compelling state interests while maintaining the integrity of 
the sacrament of Confession. 
1. Penitent Waiver of the Clergy-Penitent Privilege 
The Louisiana Supreme Court held that Mayeux’s desire to testify 
about her confession constitutes a valid waiver of the clergy-penitent 
privilege despite the objections of Bayhi and the Diocese.298 The court 
based its decision on the Code of Evidence which states that the penitent, 
not the clergy member, holds the privilege.299 A penitent’s waiver of 
privilege may be valid under the Catholic Church’s understanding of the 
seal of confession as well.300 
Under canon law, “[t]he sacramental seal is inviolable; therefore it is 
absolutely forbidden for a confessor to betray in any way a penitent in 
words or in any manner and for any reason.”301 Canon law states that a 
priest must not betray the sinner, but if the penitent waives the seal of 
confession and desires to testify about her confession, the potential for 
betrayal is no longer present. Canon law also provides that “[a] confessor 
is prohibited completely from using knowledge acquired from confession 
to the detriment of the penitent . . . .”302 If Bayhi testified about Mayeux’s 
confession he would not cause her any harm; on the contrary, any 
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information he could offer about the alleged abuse could only aid Mayeux 
and her lawyers in cross-examination and give the jury a more complete 
body of testimony for deliberation purposes. 
Thomas Reese, a canonist and Jesuit priest, argues that “the weight of 
theological and canonical opinion supports the right of penitents to allow 
their confessor to reveal what they told him in confession.”303 According 
to Reese, many canonists believe clergy should be permitted to testify if a 
penitent desires to openly discuss his or her confession.304 Father Dexter 
Brewer, a theological scholar, also addressed the validity of penitent 
waiver: 
The seal [of confession] has a very definite purpose. When the 
reasons for the seal—i.e., protection of the penitent from betrayal and 
protection of the sacrament and the faithful from scandal—dissipate 
because of the penitent’s release, then the seal no longer presents a 
barrier to the priest’s extra-sacramental communication.305 
Now that Mayeux has publicly declared her sexual abuse by voluntarily 
filing a lawsuit and electing to testify, the element of confidentiality that 
the seal of confession is designed to protect no longer exists and Bayhi 
should thus be free to speak openly about the confessions. 
Penitent waiver of the clergy-penitent privilege makes logical sense if 
a victim confides in a priest. The reasoning is ineffectual, however, if the 
abuser confesses his actions because, unless the abuser voluntarily asks 
the priest to report the crimes, a priest who incriminates his own penitent 
surely brings about detriment and betrayal.306 Consequently, much like the 
states weigh compelling interests against Free Exercise violations, 
Catholic leaders ultimately may need to evaluate whether prevention of 
child abuse and protection of victims justifies a more flexible 
interpretation of the seal of confession in these specific circumstances. 
The Church should weigh its own history of sexual abuse in 
reconsidering its stance. These scandals not only harm the reputation of 
the Church, they also cost a great deal of money. A study performed by 
the National Catholic Reporter found that over the past 65 years the 
Catholic Church in the United States incurred almost four billion dollars 
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in costs arising out of lawsuits alleging the abuse of children by priests.307 
This figure incorporates amounts spent on litigation and settlements as 
well as money spent on training and background checks for priests and 
therapy for victims of abuse.308 Though Charlet does not involve an 
abusive priest, Bayhi’s supposed failure to disclose Mayeux’s abuse has 
the potential to inflict a sizeable financial toll on the Church, in light of the 
Mayeuxs’ naming of the Diocese as a co-defendant in the lawsuit.309 Based 
on the already substantial amount spent on suits alleging the abuse of 
children by priests, the Church should be wary of positioning itself for a new 
round of high-profile, high-dollar litigation against priests refusing to report 
child abuse. Reinterpreting canon law to prioritize child protection over 
absolute confidentiality would eliminate the threat of excommunication, thus 
encouraging priests to report any suspicions of child abuse heard in the 
confessional. Such a policy would also emphasize a commitment to protection 
of the Church’s most vulnerable members. 
2. Institutional Changes Within the Priesthood to Encourage 
Reporting of Abuse 
According to Father Peter Finney III of the Archdiocese of New 
Orleans, Catholic leadership is unlikely to create caveats in canon law for 
the protection of minors.310 If the Church declines to reinterpret the 
confessional seal, it still can strive to better respond to allegations of sexual 
abuse within the confessional. Finney noted that in order to take a more 
active role, priests first need to comprehend the gravity of abuse situations 
and the reluctance of child victims to come forward.311 Priests also must 
be trained to strongly urge penitents to report their abuse to the authorities 
and avoid discouraging or shaming victims into silence, the scenario 
alleged in Charlet.312 Finney stated that of all the training priests receive 
for administering Confession, “the most important skill is to see what is 
confessed through the eyes of the penitent.”313 Finney said that priests must 
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treat the information entrusted to them with the utmost seriousness and take 
every effort to emphasize the magnitude of abusive situations to penitents 
reluctant to come forward.314  
Finney stated that priests also can attempt to obtain a penitent’s consent 
to engage in a conversation outside of the confessional while making 
absolutely clear the nature of the seal of confession and additionally 
addressing the priest’s need to leave the realm of absolute confidentiality to 
provide proper assistance.315 If the penitent agrees, Finney said a priest 
would need to establish the facts of abuse independently and cannot supply 
them from the information learned in the confessional.316 Finney 
acknowledged that the priest treads a fine line here, but clergy need not be 
completely passive in the conversation and can ask questions appropriate to 
any normal counseling meeting.317 
Finally, priests can detect signs of abuse outside of the confessional to 
gain knowledge that will trigger their duty to report and avoid breaking the 
seal of Confession.318 Finney reiterated that priests can only use information 
learned outside of the confessional but stated that priests have a moral duty as 
“invested observers” to ensure that all church-related encounters are healthy 
and safe.319 Thus, if a priest noticed evidence of abuse in his daily ministry, 
he could start asking questions.320 In the event a person accuses the priest of 
using his confessional knowledge to investigate further, the priest must 
strongly emphasize that his outside observations alone initiated the 
concern.321 If Catholic priests take note of Finney’s suggestions to take a 
less passive and more proactive role in observing signs of child abuse, the 
Charlet scenario can be avoided in the future.322 His advice also 
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demonstrates that there is in fact a way for priests to carry out their roles 
as mandatory reporters in a robust manner, while still maintaining the 
integrity of the seal of confession. 
CONCLUSION 
Abrogation of the clergy-penitent privilege in the context of 
confidential communications is constitutional because the compelling 
state interest of protecting children outweighs the narrow infringement 
upon the religious rights of clergy. A change in the law may have only a 
limited effect on Catholicism as long as priests continue to place canon 
law ahead of their legal duty to report. Imposing legal accountability on 
priests would send a strong message to the Catholic Church that perhaps 
it should reevaluate its absolute stance on the seal of confession. If the 
Church declines to reassess established doctrines of confidentiality, 
however, it must still make every effort to train its priests to discover 
information related to abuse outside of Confession that will trigger their 
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